Opening Pandora’s Box: A Systematic Study of New Ways Microarchitecture Can Leak Private Data
Published in ISCA, 2021
author = {Sanchez Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo and Schreiber, Benjamin and Paccagnella, Riccardo and Fletcher, Christopher W.},
title = {Game of Threads: Enabling Asynchronous Poisoning Attacks},
year = {2020},
isbn = {9781450371025},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378462},
doi = {10.1145/3373376.3378462},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
pages = {35–52},
numpages = {18},
keywords = {adversarial machine learning, trusted execution environment, asynchronous stochastic gradient descent},
location = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
series = {ASPLOS ’20}
}
author = {Mahmoud, Abdulrahman and Aggarwal, Neeraj and Nobbe, Alex and Vicarte, Jose and Adve, Sarita and Fletcher, Christopher and Frosio, Iuri and Hari, Siva},
year = {2020},
month = {06},
pages = {25-31},
title = {PyTorchFI: A Runtime Perturbation Tool for DNNs},
doi = {10.1109/DSN-W50199.2020.00014}
}
author = {Choi, Woo-Seok and Tomei, Matthew and Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo Sanchez and Hanumolu, Pavan Kumar and Kumar, Rakesh},
title = {Guaranteeing Local Differential Privacy on Ultra-Low-Power Systems},
year = {2018},
isbn = {9781538659847},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053},
doi = {10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 45th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture},
pages = {561–574},
numpages = {14},
keywords = {microcontrollers, randomized response, IoT, low-power systems, RAPPOR, differential privacy},
location = {Los Angeles, California},
series = {ISCA ’18}
}
Microarchitectural attacks have plunged Computer Architecture into a security crisis. Yet, as the slowing of Moore’s law justifies the use of ever more exotic microarchitecture, it is likely we have only seen the tip of the iceberg.To better anticipate this security crisis, this paper performs a systematic security-centric analysis of the Computer Architecture literature. Our rationale is that when implementing current and future processors, microarchitects will (quite reasonably) look to previously-proposed ideas. Our study uncovers seven classes of microarchitectural optimization with novel security implications, proposes a conceptual framework through which to study them and demonstrates several proofs-of-concept to show their efficacy. The optimizations we study range from those that leak as much privacy as Spectre/Meltdown (but without exploiting speculative execution) to those that otherwise undermine security-critical programs in a variety of ways. Many have storied histories— ranging from industry patents to media/3rd party speculation regarding current implementation status to recent renewed interest in the academic community. This paper’s goal is to perform an early (hopefully not too late) analysis to inform their development moving forward.