Double-Cross Attacks: Subverting Active Learning Systems

Published in Usenix, 2021

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@inproceedings{10.1145/3373376.3378462,
author = {Sanchez Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo and Schreiber, Benjamin and Paccagnella, Riccardo and Fletcher, Christopher W.},
title = {Game of Threads: Enabling Asynchronous Poisoning Attacks},
year = {2020},
isbn = {9781450371025},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378462},
doi = {10.1145/3373376.3378462},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
pages = {35–52},
numpages = {18},
keywords = {adversarial machine learning, trusted execution environment, asynchronous stochastic gradient descent},
location = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
series = {ASPLOS ’20}
}
Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Benjamin Schreiber, Riccardo Paccagnella, and Christopher W. Fletcher. 2020. Game of Threads: Enabling Asynchronous Poisoning Attacks. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS ’20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 35–52. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378462
@inproceedings{inproceedings,
author = {Mahmoud, Abdulrahman and Aggarwal, Neeraj and Nobbe, Alex and Vicarte, Jose and Adve, Sarita and Fletcher, Christopher and Frosio, Iuri and Hari, Siva},
year = {2020},
month = {06},
pages = {25-31},
title = {PyTorchFI: A Runtime Perturbation Tool for DNNs},
doi = {10.1109/DSN-W50199.2020.00014}
}
Mahmoud, Abdulrahman & Aggarwal, Neeraj & Nobbe, Alex & Vicarte, Jose & Adve, Sarita & Fletcher, Christopher & Frosio, Iuri & Hari, Siva. (2020). PyTorchFI: A Runtime Perturbation Tool for DNNs.
@INPROCEEDINGS{9499823, author={Sanchez Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo and Shome, Pradyumna and Nayak, Nandeeka and Trippel, Caroline and Morrison, Adam and Kohlbrenner, David and Fletcher, Christopher W.}, booktitle={2021 ACM/IEEE 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)}, title={Opening Pandora’s Box: A Systematic Study of New Ways Microarchitecture Can Leak Private Data}, year={2021}, volume={}, number={}, pages={347-360}, doi={10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00035}}
J. R. Sanchez Vicarte et al., "Opening Pandora’s Box: A Systematic Study of New Ways Microarchitecture Can Leak Private Data," 2021 ACM/IEEE 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), 2021, pp. 347-360, doi: 10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00035.
@inproceedings {274693, author = {Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte and Gang Wang and Christopher W. Fletcher}, title = {Double-Cross Attacks: Subverting Active Learning Systems}, booktitle = {30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)}, year = {2021}, isbn = {978-1-939133-24-3}, pages = {1593--1610}, url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/vicarte}, publisher = {USENIX Association}, month = aug, }
Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte and Gang Wang and Christopher W. Fletcher. Double-Cross Attacks: Subverting Active Learning Systems. In Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), August 21-24, 2021, San Jose, CA, USA, 1593-1610.
@inproceedings{augury:2022:vicarte:oakland22, title={Augury: Using Data Memory-Dependent Prefetchers to Leak Data at Rest}, author={Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte and Michael Flanders and Riccardo Paccagnella and Grant Garrett-Grossman and Adam Morrison and Christopher W. Fletcher and David Kohlbrenner }, booktitle={2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)}, year={2022}, organization={IEEE Computer Society} }
J. Sanchez Vicarte, et al., "Augury: Using data memory-dependent prefetchers to leak data at rest," in 2022 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (SP), San Francisco, CA, US, 2022.
@inproceedings{10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053,
author = {Choi, Woo-Seok and Tomei, Matthew and Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo Sanchez and Hanumolu, Pavan Kumar and Kumar, Rakesh},
title = {Guaranteeing Local Differential Privacy on Ultra-Low-Power Systems},
year = {2018},
isbn = {9781538659847},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053},
doi = {10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 45th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture},
pages = {561–574},
numpages = {14},
keywords = {microcontrollers, randomized response, IoT, low-power systems, RAPPOR, differential privacy},
location = {Los Angeles, California},
series = {ISCA ’18}
}
Woo-Seok Choi, Matthew Tomei, Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Pavan Kumar Hanumolu, and Rakesh Kumar. 2018. Guaranteeing local differential privacy on ultra-low-power systems. In Proceedings of the 45th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA ’18). IEEE Press, 561–574. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053

Active learning is widely used in data labeling services to support real-world machine learning applications. By selecting and labeling the samples that have the highest impact on model retraining, active learning can reduce labeling efforts, and thus reduce cost.

In this paper, we present a novel attack called Double Cross, which aims to manipulate data labeling and model training in active learning settings. To perform a double-cross attack, the adversary crafts inputs with a special trigger pattern and sends the triggered inputs to the victim model retraining pipeline. The goals of the triggered inputs are (1) to get selected for labeling and retraining by the victim; (2) to subsequently mislead human annotators into assigning an adversary-selected label; and (3) to change the victim model’s behavior after retraining occurs. After retraining, the attack causes the victim to mislabel any samples with this trigger pattern to the adversary-chosen label. At the same time, labeling other samples, without the trigger pattern, is not affected. We develop a trigger generation method that simultaneously achieves these three goals. We evaluate the attack on multiple existing image classifiers and demonstrate that both gray-box and black-box attacks are successful. Furthermore, we perform experiments on a real-world machine learning platform (Amazon SageMaker) to evaluate the attack with human annotators in the loop, to confirm the practicality of the attack. Finally, we discuss the implications of the results and the open research questions moving forward.