Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte

Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte

Hardware Security Researcher at Intel's Security Assurance and Cryptography group.

Augury: Using data memory-dependent prefetchers to leak data at rest

Published in IEEE S&P, 2022

Full Paper | bibtex | Plain Text

@inproceedings{10.1145/3373376.3378462,
author = {Sanchez Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo and Schreiber, Benjamin and Paccagnella, Riccardo and Fletcher, Christopher W.},
title = {Game of Threads: Enabling Asynchronous Poisoning Attacks},
year = {2020},
isbn = {9781450371025},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378462},
doi = {10.1145/3373376.3378462},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems},
pages = {35–52},
numpages = {18},
keywords = {adversarial machine learning, trusted execution environment, asynchronous stochastic gradient descent},
location = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
series = {ASPLOS ’20}
}
Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Benjamin Schreiber, Riccardo Paccagnella, and Christopher W. Fletcher. 2020. Game of Threads: Enabling Asynchronous Poisoning Attacks. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS ’20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 35–52. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378462
@inproceedings{inproceedings,
author = {Mahmoud, Abdulrahman and Aggarwal, Neeraj and Nobbe, Alex and Vicarte, Jose and Adve, Sarita and Fletcher, Christopher and Frosio, Iuri and Hari, Siva},
year = {2020},
month = {06},
pages = {25-31},
title = {PyTorchFI: A Runtime Perturbation Tool for DNNs},
doi = {10.1109/DSN-W50199.2020.00014}
}
Mahmoud, Abdulrahman & Aggarwal, Neeraj & Nobbe, Alex & Vicarte, Jose & Adve, Sarita & Fletcher, Christopher & Frosio, Iuri & Hari, Siva. (2020). PyTorchFI: A Runtime Perturbation Tool for DNNs.
@INPROCEEDINGS{9499823, author={Sanchez Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo and Shome, Pradyumna and Nayak, Nandeeka and Trippel, Caroline and Morrison, Adam and Kohlbrenner, David and Fletcher, Christopher W.}, booktitle={2021 ACM/IEEE 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)}, title={Opening Pandora’s Box: A Systematic Study of New Ways Microarchitecture Can Leak Private Data}, year={2021}, volume={}, number={}, pages={347-360}, doi={10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00035}}
J. R. Sanchez Vicarte et al., "Opening Pandora’s Box: A Systematic Study of New Ways Microarchitecture Can Leak Private Data," 2021 ACM/IEEE 48th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA), 2021, pp. 347-360, doi: 10.1109/ISCA52012.2021.00035.
@inproceedings {274693, author = {Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte and Gang Wang and Christopher W. Fletcher}, title = {Double-Cross Attacks: Subverting Active Learning Systems}, booktitle = {30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)}, year = {2021}, isbn = {978-1-939133-24-3}, pages = {1593--1610}, url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/vicarte}, publisher = {USENIX Association}, month = aug, }
Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte and Gang Wang and Christopher W. Fletcher. Double-Cross Attacks: Subverting Active Learning Systems. In Proceedings of the 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), August 21-24, 2021, San Jose, CA, USA, 1593-1610.
@inproceedings{augury:2022:vicarte:oakland22, title={Augury: Using Data Memory-Dependent Prefetchers to Leak Data at Rest}, author={Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte and Michael Flanders and Riccardo Paccagnella and Grant Garrett-Grossman and Adam Morrison and Christopher W. Fletcher and David Kohlbrenner }, booktitle={2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)}, year={2022}, organization={IEEE Computer Society} }
J. Sanchez Vicarte, et al., "Augury: Using data memory-dependent prefetchers to leak data at rest," in 2022 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (SP), San Francisco, CA, US, 2022.
@inproceedings{10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053,
author = {Choi, Woo-Seok and Tomei, Matthew and Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo Sanchez and Hanumolu, Pavan Kumar and Kumar, Rakesh},
title = {Guaranteeing Local Differential Privacy on Ultra-Low-Power Systems},
year = {2018},
isbn = {9781538659847},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053},
doi = {10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 45th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture},
pages = {561–574},
numpages = {14},
keywords = {microcontrollers, randomized response, IoT, low-power systems, RAPPOR, differential privacy},
location = {Los Angeles, California},
series = {ISCA ’18}
}
Woo-Seok Choi, Matthew Tomei, Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte, Pavan Kumar Hanumolu, and Rakesh Kumar. 2018. Guaranteeing local differential privacy on ultra-low-power systems. In Proceedings of the 45th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA ’18). IEEE Press, 561–574. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA.2018.00053

Microarchitectural side-channel attacks are enjoying a time of explosive growth, mostly fueled by novel transient execution vulnerabilities. These attacks are capable of leaking arbitrary data, as long as it is possible for the adversary to read that data into the processor core using transient instructions. In this paper, we present the first microarchitectural attack that leaks \emph{data at rest} in the memory system, i.e., never directly read into the core speculatively or non-speculatively. This technique is enabled by a previously unreported class of prefetcher: a data memory-dependent prefetcher (DMP). These prefetchers are designed to allow prefetching of irregular address patterns such as pointer chases. As such, DMPs examine and use the contents of memory directly to determine which addresses to prefetch. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of a pointer-chasing DMP on recent Apple processors, including the A14 and M1. We then reverse engineer the details of this DMP to determine the opportunities for and restrictions it places on attackers using it. Finally, we demonstrate several basic attack primitives capable of leaking pointer values using the DMP.

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